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NUCLEAR PLANT CONSTRUCTION AFTER 
PACIFIC GAS: A PYRRIC VICTORY FOR 
THE STATES? 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Since the world's first atomic explosion in Almogardo, New 
Mexico in 1945, Congress has attempted to maintain a regula-
tory system aimed at protecting the population from the hazards 
of the use of nuclear energy. In passing the Atomic Energy Act 
of 1946,1 and the Atomic Energy Act of 1954,2 Congress erected 
a complex regulatory scheme that initially safeguarded military 
interests8 and subsequently, in the early 1950's, promoted the 
development of a nuclear industry in the private sector. Despite 
development of nuclear energy as a source of commercial power, 
however, Congress continued to safeguard the public from the 
dangers of an uncertain technology and required that fissionable 
materials· and nuclear technology continue to be regulated by 
1. Atomic Energy Act of 1946, ch. 724, 60 Stat. 755. 
2. The Atomic Energy Act of 1954, ch. 1073, 68 Stat. 919, as amended 42 U.S.C. §§ 
2011-2096. 
3. The Congressional declaration of policy stated: 
Atomic energy is capable of application for peaceful as 
well as military purposes. It is therefore declared to be the 
policy of the United States that -
(a) the development, use and control of atomic en-
ergy shall be directed so as to make the maximum con-
tribution to the general welfare, subject at all times to 
the paramount objective of making the maximum con-
tribution to the common defense and security; and . . . 
(b) the development, use, and control of atomic en-
ergy shall be directed so as to promote world peace, im-
prove the general welfare, increase the standard of liv-
ing, and strengthen free competition in private 
enterprise. 
H.R. REP. No. 2181, 83d Cong., 2nd Sess. (1954) reprinted in 1954 U.S. CODE CONGo & 
AD. NEWS 1076, 1079 
4. Fission is a process by which a heavy element, such as uranium or plutonium, is 
used to absorb a neutron, and subsequently splits into two lighter elements, releasing 
more neutrons. A chain reaction develops as one of the released neutrons initiates 
another fission. The releasing of the neutrons produces a large amount of energy; the 
speed of the reaction can be controlled to produce a constant stream of energy. See 
generally NUCLEAR ENERGY POLICY STUDY GROUP, NUCLEAR POWER ISSUES AND CHOICES; 
359 
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the federal government.5 Along with this development of nuclear 
energy as a source of commercial electrical power, the amount of 
spent nuclears fuel began to increase.7 Unfortunately, the nu-
clear industry's vision of the development of a spent fuel 
reprocessing industry failed to materialize for a variety of rea-
sons and the federal government failed to develop a safe long-
term method to dispose of spent fuel.s As a result, the nuclear 
J. HEGERTON, ATOMIC FUEL (1964); R. LYERLY & W. MITCHELL, NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS 
(1973). 
5. The 1954 Senate bill noted that in 1946 there was little experience concerning the 
health hazards of atomic energy. This in itself was reason to keep atomic power a govern· 
ment monopoly. See S. REP. No. 1699, 83d Cong., 2nd Sess. (1954); reprinted in 1954 
U.S. CODE CONGo & An. NEWS 3456, 3458-59. 
By 1954, the United States had had nuclear capabilities for almost a decade. The 
primary purpose of the Senate was to bring the previous Act of 1946 into accord with the 
scientific, technical, economic and political changes that had occurred since 1946. See S. 
REP. No. 1699, 83d Cong., 2nd Sess; (1954); reprinted in 1954 U.S. Code Congo & Ad. 
News 3456, 3457. Additionally, Congress felt that these health problems had been dimin-
ished enough to allow greater private participation in atomic power. The Congress 
looked to the first experimental plant in Idaho, and the success of the U.S.S. Nautilus 
atomic submarine, among others. While it was recognized that many technological 
problems remained, Congress was convinced that use of atomic energy.to produce elec-
tricity would be achieved more quickly if private enterprise were encouraged to partici-
pate. [d. at 3458. 
6. The term "spent nuclear fuel" refers to highly radioactive fuel, which must be 
removed from a nuclear reactor following irradiation, the constituent elements of which 
have not been separated by reprocessing. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 10101 (23) (1983); 
OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY AsSESSMENT, MANAGING COMMERCIAL HIGH-LEVEL WASTE (April, 
1982). 
7. The U.S. Supreme Court noted that "some 8000 metric tons of spent nuclear fuel 
have already accumulated, and it is projected by the year 2000 there will be some 72,000 
metric tons of spent fuel." Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Energy Resources Commission, 
__ U.S. __ , 103 S.Ct. 1713, 1717 (1983). See also OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESS-
MENT, MANAGING COMMERCIAL HIGH LEVEL WASTE, 9 (April 1982); 128 CONGo REC. H8166 
(Sept. 30, 1982) (remarks of Rep. Winn) (twenty-eight plants may be forced to close for a 
lack of storage); id. at H8533 (Nov. 29, 1982) (remarks of Rep. Broyhill) (only 1900 met-
ric tons of spent fuel can be stored in "last resort" fuel storage areas provided by federal 
government; this is less than three percent of the total spent fuel projected to be gener-
ated by commercial power plants by the year 2000). 
8. See Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, P.L. 97-425, H. REp. 97-491, 97th Cong., 
2d Sess. 26-29 ("confidence that the technical issues affecting nuclear waste disposal 
were easily resoluable for decades rendered Federal officials responsible for providing the 
facilities apathetic towards addressing those technical issues, and unprepared for the im-
mense social and political problems which would obstruct implementation of a serious 
repository development program. ") 
The NRC has determined that the earliest date for one or more geological reposito-
ries is 2007-2009. See 48 Fed. Reg. 22730 (May, 1983). Long term disposal at the present 
time, "refers to the storage of highly radioactive waste products that pose the most se-
vere potential health hazard" until they detoxify sufficiently that they do not present an 
environmental or health hazard. There are currently no known methods of detoxifica-
tion, other than the passage of hundreds of thousands of years. See generally U.S. 
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industry, and both state and federal government, face the possi-
bility of an occurrence of both a health and an economic 
nightmare brought on by the eventual necessity of disposal of 
the fuel. 
In partial response to this multifaceted problem, the Cali-
fornia legislature, in 1976, amended a portion of the Public Re-
sources Code (known as the Warren-Alquist Act) by condition-
ing the construction of-nuclear power plants on findings by the 
State Energy Resources Conservation and Development Com-
mission ("the Energy Commission") that adequate storage facili-
ties and means of disposal are available for nuclear waste. Spe-
cifically, section 25524.1(b)9 addresses the interim storage 
problem by providing that before a nuclear plant may be con-
structed, the Energy Commission must determine on a case-by-
case basis that there will be adequate capacity for the storage of 
a plant's full core "at the time such nuclear facility requires such 
... storage." Under section 25524.l(b), the utility must provide 
full core reserve storage capacity in order that the entire reactor 
core may be stored in the event it must be removed. Section 
25524.210 addresses the long term storage problem of nuclear 
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION, RADIOACTIVE WASTES 12 (1965). 
9. Section 25524.1(b) states: 
The commission shall further find on a case-by-case basis that 
facilities with adequate capacity to reprocess nuclear fuel rods 
from a certified nuclear facility or to store such fuel if such 
storage is approved by an authorized agency of the United 
States are in actual operation or will be in operation at the 
time such nuclear facility requires such reprocessing or stor-
age; provided, however, that such storage of fuel is in an off-
site location to the extent necessary to provide continuous on-
site full core reserve storage capacity. 
10. Section 25524.2 provides in relevant part: 
No nuclear fission thermal powerplant, including any to which 
the provisions of this chapter do not otherwise apply, but ex-
cepting those exempted herein, shall be permitted land use in 
the state, or where applicable, be certified by the commission 
until both conditions (a) and (b) have been met: 
(a) The commission finds that there has been developed 
and that the United States through its authorized agency has 
approved and there exists a demonstrated technology or 
means for the disposal of high-level nuclear waste. 
(b) The commission has reported its findings and reasons 
therefor pursuant to paragraph (a) to the Legislature . . . . 
(c) As used in this section, "technology or means for the 
disposal of high-level nuclear waste" means a method for the 
permanent and terminal disposition of high level nuclear 
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waste. Under this section, the Energy Commission will not issue 
a land use certificate to any utility seeking to construct a plant 
until the Energy Commission "finds that there has been devel-
oped and that the United States through its authorized agency 
has approved and there exists a demonstrated technology or 
means for the [permanent] disposal of high-level waste."ll In 
Pacific Gas & Electric v. State Energy Resources Conservation 
and Development Commission.12 the United States Supreme 
Court addressed the question of whether California Public Re-
sources Code sections 25524.1(b) and 25524.2 were preempted by 
the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. In a unanimous opinion, the Pa-
cific Gas Court upheld the validity of section 25524.2 on the 
grounds that it was within the traditional role of a state's au-
thority to regulate electricity production by determining the fu-
ture economic viability of a nuclear power plant. I3 Despite the 
holding as to section 25524.2, the court held that the challenge 
to section 25524.l(b) was not ripe for judicial review since the 
Energy Commission had not found any nuclear plant's storage 
facilities to be inadequate. I4 
waste. It shall not necessarily require that facilities for the ap-
plication of such technology and/or means be available at the 
time the commission makes its findings. Such disposition shall 
not necessarily preclude the possibility of an approved process 
for retrieval of such waste. 
(d) The commission shall continue to receive and process 
notices of intention and applications for certification pursuant 
to this division but shall not issue a decision pursuant to Sec-
tion 25523 granting a certificate until the requirements of this 
section have been met. All other permits, licenses, approvals 
or authorizations for the entry or use of the land, including 
orders of court, which may be required may be processed and 
granted by the governmental entity concerned but construc-
tion work to install permanent equipment or structures shall 
not commence until the requirements of this section have 
been met. 
(e) Any nuclear fission power plant is exempted from the 
provisions of this section if prior to the date on which this 
section is chaptered an electric utility has performed substan-
tial construction on such powerplant and has incurred sub-
stantial expense for construction and for necessary materials 
for such powerplant, including, but not limited to, the follow-
ing sites and facilities . . . . 
11. Under Section 25524.2(c), "Disposal" is defined as a "method for the permanent 
and terminal distribution of high-level nuclear waste .... " 
12. __ U.S. __ , 103 S.Ct. 1713 [hereinafter cited as Pacific Gas). 
13. Pacific Gas at __ , 103 S.Ct. at 1731-32. 
14. [d. at __ , 103 S.Ct. at 1720. 
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The topic of preemption, and the application of this doc-
trine to this case, has been oft discussed among legal commenta-
tors prior to the final ruling on the case by the Supreme Court. 1& 
This Note will not discuss the history of the preemption doc-
trine, but instead will analyze the Pacific Gas decision and then 
consider the option left to a state once the state has concluded 
that it is not satisfied with the federal resolution of the waste 
crisis facing the country in the 1990'S.18 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. The Warren-Alquist Act 
The Warren-Alquist Actl'7 was enacted by California in 
1974. This act was adopted in furtherance of the legislature's 
perception of the state's responsibility to ensure a reliable 
source of electrical energy, and to require coordination of energy 
research and regulation at the state level. 18 
The legislature created a five-member State Energy Re-
sources and Conservation and Development commission in 1974 
(the Energy Commission) to coordinate regulation and research 
to accomplish the objective.19 The Energy Commission has 
broad authority, and holds hearings and investigations necessary 
to carry out its duties.20 The duties of the Energy Commission 
include energy planning and forecasting (such as assessment of 
alternative energy sources), conservation, and research and de-
velopment.21 
15. See e.g., Tribe, California Declines The Nuclear Gamble: Is Such a Choice Pre-
empted?, 7 ECOLOGY L.Q. 679 (1979); Murphy and La Pierre, Nuclear "Moratorium" 
Legislation In the States and the Supremacy Clause: A Case of Express Preemption, 76 
COLUM. L. REv. 392 (1976); Note, California'8 Nuclear Power Regulations: Federal Pre-
emption?, 9 HAsTINGS CONST. L.Q. 623 (1982); Note, Applications of the Preemption 
Doctrine to State Laws Affecting Nuclear Power Plants, 62 VA. L. REv. 738 (1976); 
Comment, Federal Preemption of State Laws Controlling Nuclear Power, 64 GEO. L.J. 
1323 (1976). 
16. See infra note 124 and accompanying text. 
17. The Warren-Alquist State Energy Resources Conservation and Development 
Act, CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 25000-25986 (West 1977 & Supp. 1984). 
18. Id. at § 2SOO1-25P07. 
19. Id. at § 25200. 
20. Id. at § 25210. 
21. California's system of regulatory power plants is similar to that employed by 
other states. See Pacific Legal Foundation v. State Energy Resources Commission, 659 
F.2d 903, 907, n.2 (9th Cu. 1981). 
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Section 25500 of the California Public Resources Code gives 
the Energy Commission the authority to certify all construction 
or modification of nuclear or non-nuclear power plants. To ob-
tain certification, the utilities must follow a two-step procedure. 
First, any utility planning to construct a power plant must at an 
early stage submit a "notice of intention" (NOI).22 Each NOI 
must contain at least three alternative sites for the prospective 
plant, only two of which may be near the coast.23 After hearings 
and investigations by the Energy Commission and an analysis of 
the data, the Energy Commission will approve the NOI only if at 
least two of the proposed sites are acceptable, or one site is ac-
ceptable and a good faith effort to find an alternative has been 
made.24 
If the NOI is approved, the applicant must then file an "ap-
plication for certification" (AFC), after which the Energy Com-
mission conducts a further review process not to exceed eighteen 
months.26 The AFC must contain a description of the proposed 
plant's design, safety and reliability, projections of the fuel costs 
and generating costs, and any other information that the Energy 
Commission may require.2s The Energy Commission will then 
release findings which must address the applicant's compliance 
with land use, health, environmental and other standards estab-
lished by the Energy Commission.27 As a condition of certifica-
22. Section 25502 provides: "[T]he notice shall be an attempt primarily to deter-
mine the suitability of the proposed sites to accommodate the facilities and to determine 
the general conformity of the proposed sites and related facilities with standard of the 
commission .... " Section 25504 requires that the NO! include the location of the pro-
posed plant, a summary of the design, the type of fuels to be used and, among other 
things, a preliminary statement of the relative economic, technological and environmen-
tal advantages and disadvantages of the proposed and alternative sites. CAL. PUB. REs. 
CODE § 22503 (West 1977 & Supp. 1984). 
23. As noted by the Ninth Circuit, this section implements the concept of "site 
banking." If more than one of the proposed sites is found to be acceptable, the unused 
sites are to be "banked" by the Energy Commission and made available to future appli-
cants seeking certification. Pacific Legal Foundation v. State Energy Resources Commis-
sion, 659 F.2d 903, 907 (9th Cir., 1981). 
24. CAL. PUB. REs. CODE § 22516. Additionally, the Energy Commission, in making 
its findings, shall seek out comments and recommendations from the Public Utilities 
Commission, and the California Coastal Conservation Commission. The Energy Commis-
sion should take into account proposed emergency systems, the threat of seismic h828lds, 
• ability of controlling population densities in surrounding areas, and any applicable land 
use laws. See generally CAL. PUB. REs. CODE §§ 25505-25514. 
25. Id. § 25517. 
26. Id § 25520. 
27. Id. §§ 25216.3, 25402(d), 25523. 
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tion, the Energy Commission may require the utility to obtain 
development rights to property surrounding the plant so as to 
maintain population densities at a safe leveps The Energy Com-
mission is also directed to monitor certified plants once they be-
come operational under Public Resources Code Section 25532. 
B. Amendments to the Warren-Alquist Act: The Nuclear 
Laws of 1976 
In 1976, the California legislature added several provisions 
to the Warren-Alquist Act (known collectively as "The Nuclear 
Laws") that are applicable only to nuclear plants.2s These provi-
sions imposed a moratorium on the certification of any new nu-
clear plants until the Energy Commission makes certain findings 
and submits them to the California legislature for approval. Sec-
tion 25524.1(a) prohibits the certification of nuclear plants re-
quiring fuel reprocessing until the Energy Commission finds that 
a federally approved method of fuel reprocessing exists; section 
25524.1(b) requires a case by case analysis of whether facilities 
to store spent fuel rods are available. Section 25524.2 prohibits 
the certification of all types of nuclear plants until the Energy 
Commission finds that a federally approved method of disposing 
of nuclear wastes exists; section 25524.3 prohibits the certifica-
tion of all types of nuclear plants until the Energy Commission 
has completed and submitted to the legislature a study on the 
feasibility. of undergrounding and berm containment. 30 
These amendments require the Energy Commission to de-
termine on a case by case basis whether facilities are available to 
store spent fuel rods,31 but direct the Energy Commission to 
continue to process NOl's and AFC's even though, until the 
findings required by section 25524.2 are made, the applications 
cannot be certified.32 
28. [d. § 25528. 
29. [d. §§ 25524.1, 25524.2, 25524.3. 
30. Berm containment is a method of "placing [a nuclear] reactor in a scooped out 
hole and backfilling with dirt . . . to increase the margin of safety in the event of an 
accident which breached the containment building." See Pacific Legal Foundation v. 
State Energy Resources Commission, 659 F.2d at 909, n.8 (9th Cir., 1981). 
31. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 25524(b). 
32. [d. §§ 25524.l{c), 25524.1(d), 25524.3(c). See also §§ 25500,25517 (West 1977 & 
Supp. 1984) cited in Pacific Legal Foundation v. State Energy Resources Commission, 
659 F.2d at 909 [hereinafter cited as PLF]. 
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C. The Lower Court Decisions 
The petitioners in PG & E v. Energy Res. Comm'n, Pacific 
Ga~ and Electric Company and Southern California Edison 
Company (SCE), both claimed that uncertainities caused by the 
amendments to the Warren-Alquist Act had caused them to can-
cel plans to build nuclear plants. PG & E cancelled a specific 
project known as "Stanislaus." SCE spent no money but aban-
doned general plans to build plants only known then as "Nu-
clear I" and "Nuclear 2."33 The utilities brought suit claiming 
that sections 25524.1, 25524.2 and 25524.3 were preempted by 
the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.3• The federal court for the East-
ern District of California agreed with the utilities and held that 
insofar as the challenged provisions regulate nuclear plants, they 
were preempted by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.311 The Ninth 
33. Pac. Gas & Elec. v. SERC, 489 F. Supp. 699,701-702 (1980). 
34. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2281 (1970); See also Pacific Legal Foundation v. State En-
ergy Resources & Development Commission, 472 F. Supp. 191, 192 (S.D. Cal. 1979). 
35. This case originally involved consolidated appeals from two district court cases, 
Pac. Gas & Elec. v. SERC, 489 F. Supp. 698 (E.D. Cal. 1980) [hereinafter cited as 
PG&E] and Pacific Legal Foundation v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Devel-
opment Comm'n, 472 F.Sup. 191 (S.D. Cal., 1979). In the latter case, the petitioners 
challenged the validity of § 25524.2 only. In addressing this challenge, the trial court, 
relied on the analysis used in Duke Power Company v. Carolina Environmental Group, 
Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 74 n.20 (1978) and found that only one plaintiff, Richard Thornberry, 
had standing to sue. Thornberry was a nuclear engineer hired by San Diego Gas and 
Electric Co. ("SDG & E") to work on a proposed nuclear plant known as Sundesert, 
which was abandoned by SDG & E's board of directors. 
The trial court's reason for finding standing was that in Duke Power, the United 
States Supreme Court held that a plaintiff is allowed standing by establishing that even 
though the casual connection for injury is indirect, the connection is sufficient to provide 
standing. According to the trial court, only Thornberry presented concrete injury tracea-
ble to the Nuclear Laws, as Thornberry alleged that he lost his job because the Nuclear 
Law moratorium on certification forced SDG & E to cancel the Sundesert project. The 
trial court found there was a "substantial likelihood" that the project would have pro-
ceeded absent the Nuclear Laws, and thus Thornberry'S position would not have been 
terminated. Pacific Legal Foundation v. State Energy Resources & Development 
Comm'n, 472 F.Supp. 191, 195. 
By granting the engineer's motion for summary judgment, the trial court found 
Thornberry's challenge to §§ 25524.1 and 25524.3 to be moot, but declared § 25524.2 to 
be preempted by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. Id. at 197. The Court of Appeal re-
versed. The standing doctrine established by the United States Supreme Court also re-
quires a "substantial likelihood" that the relief requested will redress the injury claimed. 
See PLF, 659 F.2d at 914, citing Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study 
Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 72, 98 S.Ct. 2620, 2630, 57 L.Ed.2d 595, 612 (1978). The Energy 
Commission's contentions that Thornberry had not demonstrated that the Sundesert 
project would be restarted or, if that occurred, whether he would be rehired by SDG & E 
caused the Ninth Circuit to determine that under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), 
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Circuit reversed, finding that only two of the challenged provi-
sions, sections 25503 and 25524.2 were ripe for review. Section 
25524.l(b) was held not to present a justiciable controversy be-
cause the Energy Commission has never taken direct action to 
require that any plant provided a specified amount of storage 
space.86 In addressing the merits, the Ninth Circuit first held 
that the nuclear moratorium provisions of section 25524.2 were 
not preempted because sections 27187 and 274(k)86 of the Atomic 
Energy Act of 1954 constitute a Congressional authorization for 
states to regulate nuclear power plants "for purposes other than 
protection against radiation hazards. "89 Second, the Ninth Cir-
cuit held that section 25524.2 was not designed to provide pro-
tection against radiation hazards, but becaUse "uncertainities in 
the nuclear fuel cycle make nuclear power an uneconomical and 
uncertain source of energy."40 Third, the court held that section 
25524.2 was not invalid as a barrier to fulfillment of the federal 
goal of encouraging the development of atomic energy in the pri-
vate sector.41 Instead, the court noted that Congress did not in-
tend that nuclear power be developed "at all costs," but only 
that it proceed consistently with other priorities, subject to con-
trols traditionally exercised by the states and expressly pre-
served by federal statute.42 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari48 on the issues of 
whether the petitioner's challenges to section 25524.1(b) and 
summary judgment was inappropriate. Id. at 913. The United States Supreme Court de-
nied certiorari, 102 S.Ct. 2959. 
36. PLF 659 F.2d at 913. 
37. 42 U.S.C. § 2018 provides: 
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to affect the au-
thority or regulations of any Federal, State, or local agency 
with respect to the generation, sale, or transmission of electric 
power produced through the use of nuclear facilities licensed 
by the Commission: Provided, That this section shall not be 
deemed to confer upon any Federal, State, or local agency any 
authority to regulate, control, or restrict any activities of the 
Commission. 
38. 42 U.S.C. § 2021(d) states: U(k) Nothing in this section shall be construed to 
affect the authority of any State or local agency to regulate activities for purposes other 
than protection against radiation hazards." 
39. PLF, 659 F.2d at 921. 
40. [d. at 925. 
41. [d. at 926. 
42. [d. at 928. 
43. 102 S.Ct. 2956. 
9
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section 25524.2 were ripe for judicial review and whether sec-
tions 25524.1(b) and 25524.2 were preempted by the Atomic En-
ergy Act of 1954. In its decision the Supreme Court affirmed, 
agreeing with the Ninth Circuit that section 25524.2 was ripe for 
judicial review, but that the questions concerning section 
25524.1 (b) were not.44 
II. THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT OPINION 
A. The Majority 
1. Ripeness 
Justice White, delivering the unanimous OpInIOn of the 
Court, began by affirming the procedural holding of the Ninth 
Circuit that the utilities' challenge to section 25524.2 was ripe 
for judicial review, but that the questions concerning section 
25524.1(b) was not. The Court observed that the basic rationale 
of the ripeness doctrine "is to prevent the courts, through avoid-
ance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in 
, abstract disagreements over administrative policies, and also to 
protect the agencies from judicial interference until an adminis-
trative decision has been formalized and its effects felt in a con-
crete way by the challenging parties. "411 
2. Preemption: State Authority and Purpose 
Before addressing the substantive issues of the utilities' 
challenge, the Court reiterated three circumstances defining 
when Congress may constitutionally preempt state authority. 
First, it is well established that Congress may preempt state au-
thority by so stating in express terms!8 Second, the Court noted, 
in the absence of explicit preemptive language, Congress' intent 
to supersede state law altogether may be surmised from a 
"scheme of federal regulation so pervasive as to make reasonable 
the inference that Congress left no room to supplement it."" 
44. Pacific Gas _ U.S. _, 103 S.Ct 1713, 1720-22. 
45. See Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1966). 
46. Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525, (1977). 
47. Pacific Gas, _ U.S. _, _,103 S.Ct. 1713, 1722; Fidelity Federal Savings 
& Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta _ U.S. _, _, 102 S.Ct. 3014, 3022 (1982); Rice v. 
Santa Fe Elevator Corp. 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947). 
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The third scenario occurs when Congress has not entirely dis-
placed state regulation, yet compliance with state law would 
conflict with federal law. Such a conflict arises when "compli-
ance with both federal and state regulations is a physical impos-
sibility,"48 or where state law "stands as an obstacle to the ac-
complishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives 
of Congress. "49 
In addressing the substantive merits, the Court noted the 
absence of any express language in the Atomic Energy Act of a 
requirement that the states must construct or authorize nuclear 
power plants, or alternatively, prohibit the states from deciding 
as an absolute or conditional matter not to permit the construc-
tion of any further reactors"~o The Court rejected the petitioners' 
argument that the Atomic Energy Act was intended to preserve 
the federal government as the sole regulator of all matters deal-
ing with nuclear or fissionable material, thereby causing section 
25524.2 to fall within the scope of an impliedly preempted field. 
Instead, the Court began its analysis with the assumption that 
the historical powers of the states were not to be superseded by 
the Atomic Energy Act absent a clear and express intent of Con-
gress. lIl Accordingly, the Court found the passing of the 1954 Act 
and the subsequent amendments to be an indication that Con-
gress intended that the federal government continue to regulate 
the radiological aspects involved in the construction and opera-
tion of nuclear power plants, but that the states keep the tradi-
tional responsibility of determining the need for new power fa-
cilities, their economic feasibility and rates and services.1I2 As 
authority for this assumption, the Court looked to Vermont 
Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC,1I3 where the Court 
stated: "There is little doubt that under. the Atomic Energy Act 
of 1954, state public utility commissions or similar bodies are 
empowered to make the initial decision regarding the need for 
power."114 Moreover, the court found the Atomic Energy Act of 
48. Pacific Gas _ U.S. _, _,103 S.Ct. 1713,1722; Florida Lime and Avo-
cado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132. 142-153 (1963). 
49. Pacific Gas at _, 103 S.Ct. at 1722; Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 
(1941). 
50. Pacific Gas at _, 103 S.Ct. at 1722. 
51. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947). 
52. Pacific Gas at _, 103 S.Ct. at 1722-23. 
53. 435 U.S. 519 (1977). 
54. Id. at 550. 
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19461111 and the Atomic Energy Act of 1954116 gave exclusive juris-
diction to the federal government only to license the transfer, 
delivery, receipt, acquisition, possession and use of nuclear 
materials. The Court noted that the Atomic Energy Commission 
(AEC) was not given authority over either the generation of 
electricity itself or the decision concerning the economic viabil-
ity of the construction of a future nuclear plant.1I7 The Court 
also noted that the successor to the AEC, the Nuclear Regula-
tory Commission (NRC), has stated that utility financial qualifi-
cations are only of concern to the NRC if related to the public 
health and safety. liS The Court concluded its discussion on the 
right of states to determine the economic viability of the con-
struction of a new nuclear plant by examining the language of 
the Atomic Energy Act itself and its subsequent amendments. 
Specifically, section 271 provides: "Nothing in this chapter shall 
be construed to affect the authority or regulations of any Fed-
eral, State or local agency with respect to the generation, sale, or 
transmission of electric power produced through the use of nu-
clear facilities licensed by the Commission."119 The Court, in ex-
amining the 1959 Amendments, also found that the goal of the 
Amendments was to increase the states' role.60 The Court ob-
served that while the authority of the federal government to 
continue to regulate the construction and operation of nuclear 
plants was reserved by the 1959 Amendments by section 
274(c),61 Congress clearly confirmed by legislating in section 
274(k)62 that state power over the production of electricity was 
not to be otherwise eliminated. Section 274(k) states: "Nothing 
55. See A(.-t of Aug. I, 1946, ch. 724, 60 Stat. 755. 
56. Act of Aug. 30, 1954, ch. 1073, 68 Stat. 919, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2281 
(1976). 
57. Pacific Gas at _, 103 S.Ct. at 1723-1724. 
58. [d. at _, 103 S.Ct. at 1724. 
59. [d. at _, 103 S.Ct. at 1724. Congress also noted in the Senate and House 
Reports of the Joint Commission on Atomic Energy that section 271 preserved the power 
of local regulatory agencies with regard to the sale, generation or distribution of electric 
power. S.REP.No. 1699, 83d Congo 2d Sess. 31 (1954); H.R. REP. No. 2181, 83d Congo 2d 
Sess. 31 (1954). 
60. Pacific Gas at _,103 S.Ct. at 1724. The Court noted that § 274(b), [42 U.S.C. 
2021(b» authorized the NRC by agreements with state governors to discontinue its regu-
latory authority over certain nuclear and lower level nuclear material "in quantities not 
sufficient to form a critical mass." [d. at _, n.20, 103 S.Ct. at 1725, n.20. 
61. § 274(c), 42 U.S.C. § 2021(c) provides in part: "The Commission shall retain 
authority and responsibility with respect to regulation of: (1) the construction and opera-
tion of any production or utilization facility; .... " [d. 
62. 42. U.S.C. § 2021(k). 
12
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in this section shall be construed to affect the authority of any 
state or local agency to regulate activities for purposes other 
than protection against radiation hazards. "63 
The Court concluded "that from the passage of the Atomic 
Energy Act of 1954, through several revisions, and to the present 
day, Congress has preserved the dual regulation of nuclear-pow-
ered electricity generation: the federal government maintains 
complete control of the safety and 'nuclear' aspects of energy 
generation; the states exercise their traditional authority over 
the need for additional generating capacity, the type of generat-
ing facilities to be licensed, land use, rate making and the 
like. "6. 
In the next major portion of the preemption discussion, the 
Court emphasized that it did not interpret section 25524.2 as 
seeking to regulate the construction or operation of a nuclear 
power plant, but instead was aimed at economic hazards. 6~ Ac-
cordingly, the Court held that the statute lies outside the feder-
ally occupied field of nuclear safety regulations.66 The Court 
held it would be clearly impermissible for California to attempt 
to regulate the construction or operation of a nuclear power 
plant, even if done out of non-safety concerns, due to the NRC's 
63. Pacific Gas __ U.S. at __ , 103 S.Ct. at 1725. The Court observed that: 
"§ 274(k) by itself limits only the preemptive effect of § 274, and does represent an 
affirmative grant of power to the states. But Congress by permitting regulating 'for pur-
poses other than protection against radiation hazards' underscored the distinction drawn 
in 1954 between the spheres of activity left respectively to the federal government and 
the states." Id. 
Moreover, the opinion holds that this regulatory structure has remained unchanged 
for purposes of this case until 1965, when the following proviso was added to section 271: 
"Provided, that this section shall not be deemed to confer upon any Federal, State or 
Local agency any authority to regulate, control or restrict any activities of the 
Commission. " 
The opinion noted that the provision was added to overrule a Court of Appeals 
opinion, Maun v. United States, 347 F.2d 970 (9th Cir. 1956). In Maun, the court inter-
preted § 271 to allow a municipality to prohibit transmission lines necessary for the 
AEC's own activities. The Supreme Court referred to the reports and documents of the 
1965 Amendment to conclude that the purpose of the 1965 provision "was to make it 
absolutely clear that the Atomic Energy Act's special provisions on licensing of reactors 
did not disturb the status quo with respect to the then existing authority of Federal, 
State, and local bodies to regulate generation, sale, or transmission of electric power." 
See Pacific Gas at __ U.S. __ ,103 S.Ct. at 1726. 
64. Pacific Gas at __ , 103 S.Ct. at 1726. 
65. Id. at _,103 S.Ct. at 1727. 
66. Id. at _,103 S.Ct. at 1728. 
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exclusive authority over the entire field of nuclear safety con-
cerns except the limited powers expressly delegated to the 
stateS.67 In dismissing any questions as to whether a state may 
completely prohibit construction of a nuclear plant until that 
state's safety concerns are satisfied by the federal government, 
the Court referred to the well established preemption test68 
which is applied when the federal government completely occ~­
pies a given field or an identifiable portion thereof: "[T]he test 
of preemptions is whether 'the matter on which the state asserts 
the right to act is in any way regulated by the federal govern-
ment.' "69 In applying the test, the Court held that a conflict 
would arise with a judgment that nuclear power is not safe 
enough to be further developed, and that in effect, any state 
prohibition on nuclear construction for safety reasons would 
conflict with the Atomic Energy Act's objective to insure that 
nuclear technology be safe enough for widespread development 
and use.70 In deciding whether there was a non-safety rationale 
for section 25524.2, the Court first looked to the report by the 
California Assembly Committee on Resources, Land Use, and 
Energy ("the Committee").71 In that report,72 the Committee es-
sentially viewed the problem as one where non-disposable wastes 
accumulate with no permanent disposal sites available, thereby 
creating a "clog" in the nuclear fuel cycle.78 The Committee de-
termined that, without a permanent means of disposal, the nu-
clear waste problem made nuclear power an economically uncer-
tain and unpredictable source of power which could lead to the 
creation of high costs to contain the problem or closure of al-
ready existing plants.74 The Court agreed with the Ninth Cir-
cuit's reliance on the Committee Report to find that the statute 
67. ld. See also note 147 infra and accompanying text. Congress has authorized the 
states to regulate radioactive air pollutants from nuclear power plants under the Clean 
Air Act Amendments of 1977, § 122,42 U.S.C. § 742, and to impose certain citing and 
land use requirements for nuclear plants. See NRC Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
190, Pub. L. 96-295, 94 Stat. 780 (1980). 
68. See e.g. Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, _ U.S._, 
_, 102 S.Ct. 3014, 3022 (1982); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 236, 67 
S.Ct. 1146, 1152 (1947). 
69. Pacific Gas at _, 103 S.Ct. at 1726. 
70. ld. at _,103 S.Ct. at 1727. 
71. ld. at _,103 S.Ct. at 1727. 
72. REASSESSMENT OF NUCLEAR ENERGY IN CALIFORNIA: A POLICY ANALYSIS OF PRO-
POSITION 15 AND ITS ALTERNATIVES (1976) (Reassessment Report). 
73.ld. 
74. ld. at 156. 
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was directed towards purposes other than protection against ra-
diation hazards and stated that "California is concerned not 
with the adequacy of the method, but rather with its exist-
ence."711 
The opinion reiterated that the Court places "considerable 
confidence in the interpretations of state law reached by the fed-
eral courts of appeals."?6 In support of the Ninth Circuit's inter-
pretation of California's intent, the Court found sufficiently 
specific the language of the statute which states that the "devel-
opment" and "existence" of a permanent disposal technology 
approved by federal authorities will lift the moratorium. The 
Court held the language of the statute evinced sufficient concern 
with the economics of nuclear power by observing that "[o]nce a 
technology is selected and demonstrated, the utilities and the 
California Public Utilities Commission would be able to estimate 
costs; such cost estimates cannot be made until the federal gov-
ernment has settled upon the method of long-term waste dispo-
sal."?? The Court held meritless the suggestion by the petition-
ers that California, if concerned with economics, would have 
banned California utilities from building plants outside the 
state.?8 The Court noted there was no indication that California 
utilities were contemplating such construction and accordingly 
that the California legislature was not "obligated to address 
purely hypothetical facets of a problem. "?9 The Court also held 
that the statute was not invalidated simply because the Califor-
nia Public Utilities Commission was authorized, on a case by 
case basis, to determine on economic grounds whether a nuclear 
power plant should be constructed. The Court observed that 
California was not foreclosed from reaching the same decision 
through a legislative judgment because the economic uncertain-
ties involved with nuclear waste disposal do not differ from facil-
ity to facility. The Court concluded that "the issue readily lends 
itself to more generalized decision making and California cannot 
be faulted for pursuing that course."80 The Court rejected the 
suggestion the statute be invalidated on the ground that section 
75. PLF, 659 F.2d at 925. 
76. Pacific Gas at _, 103 S.Ct. at 1727. 
77. ld. at _,103 S.Ct. at 1727. 
78. ld. at _,103 S.Ct. at 1727. 
79. ld. at _, 103 S.Ct. at 1728. 
80. ld. at _,103 S.Ct. at 1728. 
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25524.2 arose after the defeat of Proposition 15,81 a voter initia-
tive that, along with the Nuclear Laws, was clearly written with 
safety purposes in mind. The Court observed that Proposition 
15 was not passed by the voters of California and was not before 
the Court. In concluding, the Court stated "these provisions and 
their pedigree do not twist other parts of the Warren-Alquist 
Act. 1182 
'The Court provided two additional reasons for declining to 
overturn the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of California's intent 
in enacting Section 25524.2. First, "the Court declined to inquire 
into the motive of the legislature."8s The Court noted that it 
would be difficult to determine the motivation of each and every 
legislator. Second, the opinion concluded that it would be inap-
propriate for the court to engage in speculation as to the motiva-
tion of the legislature in light of the well established state au-
thority to not only determine the need for electrical generating 
facilities, but also to halt the construction of new nuclear plants 
by refusing on economic grounds to issue certification of public 
convenience. M 
3. Preemption: Conflict Between Regulations 
The Court found that section 25524.2 does not conflict with 
federal regulations of nuclear waste disposal, notwithstanding 
the decision in Natural Resources Defense Council, v. NRC8r. 
81. The subject nuclear provisions were passed by the California legislature before 
the people voted on Proposition 15 (California Nuclear Initiative). Proposition 15 would 
have banned nuclear plants absent a determination by the California legislature that 
nuclear wastes could be "stored and disposed of with no reasonable chance of intentional 
or unintentional escape of nuclear wastes or radioactivity into the environment which 
would adversely affect the land or the people of California. See generally PLF 659 F.2d 
at 925. Had Proposition 15 passed, the Nuclear Laws would not have become operative. 
See 1976 Cal.Stats, chs. 194, § 2; 195, § 2; 196 § 2. See generally Tribe, California De-
clines The Nuclear Gamble: Is Such a Choice Preempted?, ECOLOGY L.Q. 679, 680 n.5 
(1979). 
82. Pacific Gas at _, 103 S.Ct. at 1728. 
83.ld. 
84. Id. 
85. 582 F.2d 166, 168-169 (2nd Cir. 1978). The NRC refused to halt nuclear reactor 
licensing until it had developed a method of permanent waste disposal. Pursuant to the 
language of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2071-2075, 2111-2114, both the 
AEC and its successor, the NRC, have promulgated extensive regulations concerning 
both the handling of nuclear materials and the operation of civilian and military nuclear 
facilities. Under 10 CFR 50.34(b)(20)(i)-(ii), an applicant seeking to receive a NRC oper-
16
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that it was appropriate for the NRC to conclude that it could 
continue to license new reactors given the availability of interim 
storage and the progress toward the development of long term 
disposal facilities. In support of its conclusion, the Court first 
noted that, despite the NRC's finding that it is safe to continue 
to license new reactors, the NRC's finding does not suggest that 
it is economically wise to do SO.86 Compliance with both section 
25524.2 and federal regulation would be possible because· the 
NRC order does not and could not compel a utility to develop a 
nuclear plant.87 The Court observed that the NRC's regulations 
are not aimed at determining the economic feasibility of the 
construction of a new nuclear plant, but are aimed at insuring 
that nuclear plants are safe.88 The Court again noted that the 
statute acknowledges that it is the federal responsibility to de-
velop and license the technology surrounding nuclear waste dis-
posal; thus California did not attempt to impose its own stan-
dards on nuclear waste disposal and did not improperly attempt 
to enter an occupied field.8e In addressing an issue not previ-
ating license must submit a safety analysis report, which include8 a "radioactive waste 
handling system. Under 10 CFR pt. 50 App. A, Criteria 60-64 at 412, regulations specify 
design criteria and control requirements for onsite storage and handling of radioactive 
waste." The NRC has also promulgated detailed regulations concerning offsite storage 
and disposal of radioactive waste. Requirements covering license applications for dispo-
sal of high level radioactive waste in geologic repositories also have been promulgated by 
the NRC. 10 CFR pt. 60. However, as the Court observed, no permanent disposal facili-
ties have been licensed, and the NRC and the Department of Energy presently authorize 
the storage of spent fuel at reactor sites in pools of water. 
86. Pacific Gas at _, 103 S.Ct. at 1724. The NRC maintained in Natural Re-
sources Defense Council, Inc. v. NRC that it had to examine only on-site safety risks in 
its licensing decisions. See 42 Fed. Reg. 34391 (1978). The economic feasibility of a new 
nuclear power plant absent a long term disposal technology was not at issue. In that 
case, the Second Circuit limited its discussion to "whether [the] NRC, prior to granting 
nuclear power reactor operating licenses, is required by the public health and safety re-
quirements to make a determination ... that high-level radioactive wastes can be per-
manently disposed of safely." National Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. NRC, 582 F.2d 
166, 170 (2nd Cir. 1978). 
In declining to find a conflict between § 25524.2 and the NRC's regulations, the 
Pacific Gas Court noted that "the NRC's proceeding addressing the extent to which 
assessments of waste disposal technology should be factored into NRC reactor licensing 
does not address the economic ramifications of this issue." Pacific Gas at 1729. This 
matter however, is presently before the Court. See National Resources Defense Council, 
Inc. v. NRC, 547 F.2d 633 (D.C. Cir. 1976); rev'd sub nom Vermont Yankee Nuclear 
Corp. v. National Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 579, (1978), on remand, 685 F.22d 459 
(DC Cir. 1982), cert. granted, _ U.S. _, 103 S.Ct. 433 (1982). 
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ously discussed in the lower court decisions, the Court held that 
the passage of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 198290 did not 
create a conflict between federal regulation of waste disposal and 
section 25524.2. The Court examined the purpose of this act91 
and noted that the bill, inter alia, provides financing for re-
search and development, and authorizes repositories for disposal 
of high level waste and spent nuclear fuel, along with provisions 
for the licensing and expansion of interim storage.92 However, 
the Court concluded through an examination of the legislative 
history that "while the passage of this new legislation may con-
vince state authorities that there is now a sufficient federal com-
mitment to fuel storage and waste disposal, . . . it does not ap-
pear that Congress intended to make that decision for the states 
"98 
4. Preemption: Frustration of Purpose 
The Court held that section 25524.2 does not frustrate the 
Atomic Energy Act's purpose of developing the commercial use 
of nuclear power. 9. The Court enunciated the well established 
test that "state law is preempted if it 'stands as an obstacle to 
the accomplishment of the full purposes and objectives of Con-
gress.' "911 While the Court acknowledged that "the primary pur-
pose of the Atomic Energy Act was, and continued to be, the 
promotion of nuclear power,"96 the Court held that the promo-
tion of nuclear power is not to be accomplished "at all costS."97 
[d. 
90. Pub L. 97-425, 96 Stat. 2201 (1982). 
91. Section 111(b) lists the following purposes: 
(1) to establish a schedule for the siting, construction and op-
eration of repositories that will provide a reasonable assurance 
that the public and the environment will be adequately pro-
tected from the hazards posed by high-level wastes and ... 
spent nuclear fuel .... (2) to establish the Federal responsi-
bility, and a definite Federal policy, for the disposal of such 
waste and spent fuel . . . . 
92. Pacific Gas at _, 103 S.Ct. at 1730. 
93. [d. 
94. Pacific Gas at _, 103, S.Ct. at 1730-31. 
95. [d. at _,103 S.Ct. at 1730-1731; Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941); 
Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. 373 U.S. 132, 142-143 (1963); Fidelity Federal 
Savings and Loan Assn'n v. de la Cuesta, _ U.S. _, _, 102 S.Ct. 3014 (1982). 
96. Pacific Gas at _, 103 S.Ct. at 1731. 
97. [d. at _, 103 S.Ct. at 1731. 
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The Court, however, refused to follow the Ninth Circuit's sug-
gestion that legislation since 1974 has indicated a change in con-
gressional outlook.B8 The Court essentially relied on the ration-
ale that Congress has allowed the States to determine as a 
matter of economic feasibility whether a nuclear plant should be 
built.88 In concluding the opinion, the Court stated that it would 
not assume the role of Congress and left it to Congress to re-
think the division of regulatory authority since the existing regu-
latory structure in effect allows the states to undercut a federal 
objective. 100 
B. Concurring Opinion 
Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice Stevens, concurred in 
the judgment, but focused his analysis on the Court's suggestion 
that a state may not prohibit the construction of nuclear power 
plants solely out of concern for the safety aspects of such a 
plant. 101 In noting that the Court had found that California's 
motivation for enacting section 25524.2 had been a desire to 
avoid a potentially economically unfeasible project, he observed 
that such language was unnecessary to the Court's holding.102 
Justice Blackmun noted that "Congress has occupied not 
the broad field of 'nuclear safety concerns,' but only the nar-
rower area of how a nuclear plant should be constructed and op-
erated to protect against radiation hazards. "103 In noting that 
states traditionally have had the authority to choose which tech-
nologies will meet their energy needs, the concurrence found no 
evidence that Congress had a "clear and manifest purpose"l04 to 
"force States to be blind to whatever special dangers are posed 
by nuclear plants."lOI1 Essentially, Justice Blackmun adopted the 
view that if States were preempted from making an evaluation 
of the feasibility of a plant on safety grounds, a regulatory vac-
uum would be created, and thus the decision whether to build a 
nuclear facility would ultimately be made by the utility seeking 
98. Id. at _,103 S.Ct. at 1731. 
99. Id. at _, 103 S.Ct. at 1731. 
100. Id. at _, 103 S.Ct. at 1731-32. 
101. Id. at _, 103 S.Ct. at 1732. 
102. [d. at _,103 S.Ct. at 1732. 
103. Id. at _, 103 S.Ct. at 1732. 
104. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947). 
105. PG & E Co. v. Energy Res. Comm'n, _ U.S. at _, 103 S.Ct at 1733. 
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its construction,108 rather than the state affected. 
Justice Blackmun observed that a flat ban on the construc-
tion of nuclear plants for health and safety reasons would not 
conflict with the NRC's judgment that construction of nuclear 
plants may safely proceed. He reasoned that because the NRC 
has only held that construction may safely proceed, and neither 
the NRC or Congress had mandated the states to construct nu-
clear plants, compliance with both state and federal regulation 
would still be possible.l07 
Justice Blackmun voiced the opinion that a safety-initiated 
ban on the construction of new plants would not stand as an 
obstacle to accomplishment and execution of the objective of 
Congress to make nuclear energy available to the states. lOS The 
Justice reasoned that "the Atomic Energy Act was intended to 
promote the technological development of nuclear power, at a 
time when there was no private nuclear industry." Moreover, 
Justice Blackmun observed that "Congress did not compel states 
to give preference to the eventual product of that industry or to 
ignore the peculiar problems associated with the product."lOe 
Justice Blackmun noted that the legislative history of the En-
ergy Reorganization Act of 1974110 expressed concern about a 
pro-nuclear bias in the regulatory agency.1ll With the passage of 
the Act, promotional and regulatory functions in the area of nu-
clear power were separated by the creation of the NRC and the 
Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA).ll2 
The Justice added that the Reorganization Act and subsequent 
legislation allowing the states to prohibit the construction of nu-
clear plants for non-nuclear reasons are manifestations of Con-
gress' intent that nuclear power remain an option to the states 
but "that the decision whether to build nuclear plants remains 
106. For a similar view see Wiggins, Federalism, Balancing and the Burger Court: 
California's Nuclear Law as a Preemption Case Study, 13 U.C.D.L. REV. 3, 64 (1979). 
107. Pacific Gas at _, 103 S.Ct. at 1733. 
108. [d. at _,103 S.Ct. at 1733. 
109. [d. at _,103 S.Ct. at 1734. 
110. 88 Stat. 1233, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5801-5891. 
111. [d. at _, 103 S.Ct. at 1734. 
112. The Act provided that the NRC would assume the regulatory and licensing 
function of the AEC. See 42 U.S.C. § 5341. Under Section 5801(a), ERDA was created to 
"develop, and increase the efficiency and reliability of use of, all energy sources." In 
1977, ERDA's functions were transferred to the Department of Energy. 91 Stat 577, 42 
U.S.C. § 7151(a) (1976 ed., Supp. IV). 
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with the States."us Justice Stevens concluded by asserting that 
"a ban on construction of nuclear plants would be valid even if 
its authors were motivated by fear of a core meltdown or other 
nuclear catastrophe. "114 
IV. CRITIQUE 
The Court's decision in Pacific GasUl'> is a sound but 
conservative interpretation of Congress' intent in enacting the 
Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and its subsequent amendments. 
Justice White's application of the Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator 
Corp.U8 preemption test shows that Congress intended to main-
tain a dual regulatory system which restricts the NRC's author-
ity to national security, health, and safety, while preserving the 
traditional state police power to regulate its utilities and the 
generation of electrical power. Despite this thorough preemption 
analysis, many questions concerning this delicate state-federal 
balance remain. 
A. When State Law Will be Preempted 
The Pacific Gas Court impliedly indicated that the three-
part Rice test should be applied to all state legislation that di-
rectly or indirectly affects the construction or operation of nu-
clear power plants. Hence, the traditional powers of the States 
to regulate electrical power will not be superseded unless the 
States' legislation is aimed at regulating the construction or op-
eration of the plant themselves,117 or in fact affects the NRC's 
113. Pacific Gas at _, 103 S.Ct. at 1734. Justice Blaclunun concluded that Con-
gress has continued to promote alternative sources of energy such as coal and small 
cogenerative and other small power facilities, without giving preference to nuclear power. 
See e.g., Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act of 1978, 92 Stat. 3291, 42 U.S.C. §§ 
8301 et seq. (1976 ed. Supp. IV); Public Utilities Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, § 210, 
92 Stat. 3144, 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3 (1976 ed., Supp. IV). 
It is also well established the States have the authority to establish siting and land 
use requirements for nuclear plants that are more stringent than those of the NRC. Ct., 
NRC Authorization Act for Fiscal 190, Pub. L., 96-295, § 103(0, 94 Stat. 783 (1980), and 
under the 1977 Clean Air Act amendments, the States may regulate radioactive air emis-
sions and impose more stringent standards than those of the NRC. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 
7416,7422 (1983 Ed. & Supp. IV). 
114. Pacific Gas at _, 103 S.Ct. at 1734. 
115. Pacific Gas at _, 103 S.Ct. at 1731. 
116. 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947). 
117. See e.g. County of Suffolk v. Long Island Lighting Co., 554 F.Supp. 399,404-
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authority to regulate the construction or operation of a nuclear 
power plant, or would stand as an obstacle to the "promotion of 
nuclear power."118 Referring to the Vermont Yankee 119 decision, 
the Court stated: "There is little doubt that under the Atomic 
Energy Act of 1954, state public utility commissions or similar 
bodies are empowered to make the initial decision regarding the 
need for power."120 While the Court found that sections 271121 
and 274122 of the Act expressly allowed the states to retain this 
power, the Court also found that the "federal government has 
occupied the entire field of nuclear safety concerns, except the 
limited powers expressly limited to the States."l23 This language 
suggests that state action regulating nuclear plants will be pre-
empted if the federal government has not provided an exception 
for this type of regulation. 
Additionally, despite finding that "a primary purpose of the 
Atomic Energy Act was, and continues to be the promotion of 
nuclear power,"m the Court concluded that section 25524.2 did 
not "stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the full pur-
poses and objectives of Congress,"121i since the "promotion of nu-
clear power is not to be accomplished at all costs. "128 Therefore 
the analysis applied to section 25524.2 acknowledges that states 
have retained the right initially to decide the need for the con-
struction of nuclear plants on economic reasons, but prevents 
state regulation in any area not expressly ceded to the states 
that would arguably either affect the NRC's authority to regu-
late the safety aspects of the construction and operation of a 
plant or would stand as an obstacle to the "promotion of nuclear 
power." This analysis suggests that once a plant is built, the 
state is powerless to regulate a commercial plant which the state 
405 (E.D.N.Y. 1983). 
118. Pacific Gas at _, 103 S.Ct. at 1731. 
119. 435 U.S. 519 (1977). 
120. [d. at 550. 
121. 42 U.S.C. 2018, see Pacific Gas at _, 103 S.Ct. at 1724. 
122. 42 U.S.C. 2021(c), see Pacific Gas at _, 103 S.Ct. at 1724. 
123. Pacific Gas at _, 103 S.Ct. at 1724, In addition to the authority under § 
274(c) to regulate certain low-level radiological materials, Congress has allowed the states 
to impose certain siting and land use requirements for nuclear plants. See e.g., Consoli-
dated Edison Company of New York, Inc. (Indian Point Station, Unit No.2) ALAB-453, 
7 N.R.C. 31, 34 n.13 (1978). 
124. Pacific Gas at _, S.Ct. at 1731. 
125. [d. at _, 103 S.Ct. at 1730-1731. 
126. [d. at _, 103 S.Ct. at 1731. 
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believes to be harmful to its citizens. 
Notwithstanding the application of this preemption analy-
sis, the extent of state power still remains unclear. While the 
. dicta in the opinion suggests that "safety" is an area in which 
the states may not regulate nuclear facilities, the Court never-
theless observed that the legislative history of the Atomic En-
ergy Act allows the states to exercise their "traditional authority 
over the need for additional generating capacity, the type of gen-
erating facilities to be licensed, land use, ratemaking and the 
like. "l27 In conjunction with this, however, the Court broadly 
stated that the states will be preempted, if "the matter on which 
the state asserts the right to act is in any way regulated by the 
federal government."128 
The Court also specifically observed that a prohibition on 
nuclear construction for safety reasons would be an obstacle to 
Congress' objective "that nuclear technology be safe enough for 
widespread development and use. "129 This suggests that any fu-
ture legislation which for health and safety concerns attempts to 
either prohibit construction of a new plant, or, alternatively, to 
decommission existing plants,130 would be preempted not only as 
conflicting with a field already occupied by the NRC, but for 
blocking the federal goal of promoting nuclear power. Accord-
ingly the language of the opinion suggests that only by finding 
that the continued operation of a plant will be economically un-
feasible would a state have a proper rationale to prohibit con-
struction or independently request the decommission of a nu-
clear power plant181 out of health concerns for the nuclear waste 
127. [d. at _,103 S.Ct. at 1726. 
128. [d. at _, 103 S.Ct. at 1730-31. 
129. [d. at _, 103 S.Ct. at 1731. 
130. In a June, 1983 NRC study, the Commission estimated that thirty-nine plants 
in nineteen States will be required to shut down for lack of storage space. See H. REP. 
97-735, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (1982) (federal govt. waste management policies can be 
seen to have exacerbated or created a spent fuel bottleneck; growing inventories of spent 
fuel at the power nuclear sites have heightened public concern); 128 CONGo BEc. H8169 
(Sept. 30, 1982) (remarks of Rep. Broyhill); 128 CONGo REc. H8170 (Sept. 30, 1982) (re-
marks of Rep. Moorhead) ("comprehensive nuclear waste disposal must provide not only 
for the long-term problem of nuclear waste but it must also alleviate the short-term 
problem of a lack of interim storage capacity for spent nuclear fuel"). 
131. The NRC currently expects to issue in 1984 a proposed rule dealing with 
decommissioning of nuclear power plants. See In the Matter of Maine Yankee Atomic 
Power Co. (Maine Yankee Atomic Power Station) 18 NRC 152 (1983). The NRC has 
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disposal problem. 
B. The Court's Analysis of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act 
of 1982 
These guidelines do not at the present time suggest that 
other states will be powerless to act to prohibit construction, or, 
in the event of a critical storage problem, request that a com-
mercial plant be closed down.182 The Court observed that, subse-
quent to the Ninth Circuit's opinion, Congress passed the Nu-
clear Waste Policy Act of 1982133 (Waste Policy Act). The Waste 
Policy Act expresses a federal commitment to create more short-
term spent fuel storage and to provide for the development of 
long term disposal through a federally financed research and de-
velopment program.134 In conjunction with this, the Court's in-
quiry centered on whether or not the Waste Policy Act pre-
empted California's legislation by exhibiting enough of a federal 
commitment to the storage problem, that the accumulation of 
fuel would not pose an economic problem and construction 
would be able to resume. The Court concluded that, despite this 
federal commitment, Congress itself had not intended to make 
the decision for the states that the nuclear waste disposal system 
problem had been resolved.18G 
Therefore, a legislature which conducts the proper economic 
studies and concludes that it would be economically infeasible to 
continue to operate a plant could conceivably pass a valid law 
requesting a moratorium on construction or, in the event of a 
severe storage problem, decommission.13s All of this would de-
pend on the technological advances of the federal government in 
searching for the solution to the problem of long term disposal. 
determined in the "Waste Confidence" Rulemaking Decision, 44 Fed. Reg. 61372, that 
there is a "reasonable assurance" that spent fuel can be stored safely in storage basins at 
reactor sites for an extended period of time until the availability of geologic repositories 
for safe, permanent disposal. See 48 Fed. Register 22730 (May 20, 1983). 
132. See supra note 124, 130; see also note 167, infra. 
133. Pub L 97-425, 96 Stat 2201 (1982). Under this act, utilities are required, inter 
alia to contract with the Department of Energy and provide prepayment for waste dispo-
sal services that will ultimately require. See 48 Fed. Reg. 22730 (May 20, 1983). 
134. Pacific Gas at _, 103 S.Ct. at 1730-1731. See also H.R. REP. No. 491, 97th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 26, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONGo & An. NEWS 3792. 
135. Pacific Gas at _, 103 S.Ct. at 1730-1731. 
136. See supra note 124, 130; see also infra note 167 and accompanying text. 
24
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 14, Iss. 2 [1984], Art. 6
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol14/iss2/6
1984] NUCLEAR PLANT CONSTRUCTION 383 
A NRC determination that an adequate long term disposal 
method exists could prohibit such a law from being valid.1S7 
C. Pacific Gas Compared to Earlier Preemption Decisions 
The Supreme Court in Pacific Gas rendered a judgment 
which is consistent with other preemption decisions. However, 
the Court's dicta prohibiting states from acting out of safety 
concerns that might arguably affect plant construction or opera-
tion in an ancillary manner unnecessarily deprives the states of 
their traditional regulatory power left to the states under the 
dual regulatory system created by Congress. 
During the late 1960's, the AEC urged that environmental 
concerns were the "exclusive concerns" of the states and could 
not be taken into account during AEC licensing. However, in 
New Hampshire v. AEC,1S8 the First Circuit held that the AEC 
would not be relieved of its duty to comply with authorities who 
must deal with thermal effects of atomic power plant dis-
charges.lss Similarly, in Northern States Power Co. v. Minne-
sota,140 the Eighth Circuit held that Minnesota was preempted 
from imposing more stringent standards on the level of radioac-
tive discharges than required by the AEC.I41 However, in focus-
137. See supra note 125, 131. 
138. 406 F.2d 170, (1st Cir., 1969), cert. den. 395 U.S. 962, (1969) 
139. 406 F.2d at 175-76, cert. den., 397 U.S. 962. 
140. 447 F.2d 1142 (8th Cir., 1971), a!f'd memo U.S. 1035. Despite an acknowledg-
ment by the Supreme Court that the Pacific Gas opinion was "fully consistent" with 
Northern States, the Court included the caveat that the summary affirmance of the 
Northern States holding "is not to be read as an adoption of the reasoning supporting 
the judgments under review." [d. 
141. 447 F.2d at 1150. Other courts have viewed the Atomic Energy Act as preempt-
ing only state regulations aimed at radioactive hazards. See e.g., Marshall V. Consumers 
Power Co., 65 Mich. App. 237 N.W. 2d 266 (1975) (plaintiff had standing to sue nuclear 
plant for nuisance due to steam, fog and ice carried by the plant's cooling pond); New 
Jersey Dept. of Environmental Protection V. Jersey Central Power and Light Co., 69 N.J. 
102, 351 A.2d 337 (1976) (state regulation conflicting with the AEC preempted, but not 
all state regulations of nuclear plants for all purposes); Northern California Ass'n to Pre-
serve Bodega Head and Harbor, Inc. V. Public Utilities Comm'n, 61 Cal.2d 126, 133,37 
Cal. Rptr. 432, 436, 390 P.2d 200, 204 (1964) (State can prevent reactor from being built 
in an earthquake zone since "safety considerations in addition to radiation hazards were 
involved."). But see Commonwealth of Pennsylvania V. General Public Utilities Corp. 
710 F.2d 117, 120 (3rd Cir. 1983) (plaintiff who based a public nuisance claim arising out 
of Three Mile Island incident could not obtain injunctive relief to close the plant since 
the federal government has, under Pacific Gas holding, "sole and exclusive" ju· 
risdiction."). 
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ing on the power of the States to regulate non-radiation hazards, 
the Northern States court observed that" [C]ongress was not by 
[including] subsection (c) of the 1959 Amendment, in any way 
further limiting the power of the States to regulate activities, 
other than radiation hazards . . . . "142 
The Pacific Gas opinion is not consistent with the policy 
underlying these lower court opinions. While the Court acknowl-
edges that states have traditionally possessed the express au-
thority to determine what type of commercial plant an individ-
ual state needs to construct in order to meet its energy needs,u3 
the Court nevertheless concludes that a state may not exercise 
its traditional police powers by considering any health and 
safety factors when deciding what type of technology is appro-
priate, due to the pervasiveness of the federal government in the 
safety area. Thus, while Congress has never expressly indicated 
that the states may not consider these factors when deciding if it 
is appropriate to built a commercial nuclear plant, states seeking 
to avoid this judicially created roadblock to the consideration of 
the health and safety or environmental effects must provide an 
economic rationale since "the matter on which the State asserts 
the right to act is . . . regulated by the federal government but 
there has been no federal regulation of the economic considera-
tions of nuclear power."U4 
This departure from the approach of the two prior decisions 
is unsettling because the Court is, in essence, denying the states 
the traditional authority to decide when the social, political, en-
vironmental and health benefits of a power plant (as well as eco-
nomic) are outweighed by those same risks. As Justice Black-
mun stated in his concurring opinion, "the Court has read too 
much into the Act, in suggesting that the Act prohibits the 
States from determining what types of electrical power to util-
ize."uli Moreover, by concluding that the federal government has 
occupied the"entire field of safety,"U6 the Court will have essen-
tially shifted the burden to the States to prove that their legisla-
tion occupies a narrow enough area to be considered as not con-
142. 447 F.2d at 1150. 
143. Pacific Gas at _, 103 S.Ct. 17-23. 
144. [d. at _, 103 S.Ct. at 17-26. 
145. [d. at _,103 S.Ct. at 1713. 
146. [d. at _, 103 S.Ct. at 1730-1731. 
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flicting generally with the established federal regulatory areas of 
construction and operation, or not conflicting specifically with 
the NRC determination that nuclear energy is "safe". Hence, de-
spite Congress' intent that the states not lose any traditional 
powers, states must avoid the "entire area" of safety that is not 
expressly provided for as an exception by Congress. 
Thus, the Pacific Gas court's narrowing of the preemption 
inquiry not only suggests a departure from previous decisions 
that states may enact health or environmental legislation which 
does not conflict with federal safety regulation, but sends a clear 
message to the States on how to avoid this judicially created 
obstacle. 
D. The Moratorium As A Frustration of Congressional 
Purpose 
1. Majority Opinion 
Concerning the petitioner's challenge that a moratorium on 
construction would frustrate the Atomic Energy Act's purpose to 
develop the commercial use of nuclear power, the Court con-
cluded that the primary purpose of the Act continues to be the 
promotion of nuclear power.14'1 While there is little doubt that 
Congress sought to encourage private industry to enter the field, 
the Court failed to follow its own rule stated in Pennhurst 
School and Hospital v. Halderman: 148 "[I]n expounding a stat-
ute, we must not be guided by a single sentence, but look to the 
provisions of the whole law and its object and policy."l49 In this 
respect, the Ninth Circuit failed to convince the Court that the 
Congressional goal of promoting development of alternative en-
ergy sources and the restructuring of the federal regulatory 
agencies by the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 was an indi-
cation of a change in the Congressional outlook for a more "bal-
anced approach" to nuclear power development. 
Viewed as a whole, this portion of the Court's findings are 
the least sound. This portion of the Court's opinion is the most 
conservative and indicates a political posture in support of nu-
147. [d. at _, 103 S.Ct. at 1730-31. 
148. 451 U.S. 1, 18 (1981). 
149. [d. 
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clear power. The Act gives the states the authority to keep the 
plants from being built if the planned plant is inconsistent with 
a state's power needs, or environmental or other interests. More-
over, as the Court noted, a state may through its zoning powers 
deny a land use permit or could refuse to issue certificates of 
public convenience.lIiO These powers are themselves indicia of 
Congress' intent to allow a state to decide not only whether a 
plant is economically feasible, but if it is appropriate for their 
citizens. In Vermont Yankee/Ill the Court states: "Time may 
prove wrong the decision to develop nuclear energy, but it is 
Congress or the States within their appropriate agencies which 
must eventually make that judgment."U2 Notwithstanding this 
dicta and the Pacific Gas Court's concession that "nuclear power 
is not to be accomplished "at all costs,"lII3 the Pacific Gas Court 
appears to have retreated from a neutral position by concluding 
that recent legislation has not changed the federal goal of pro-
moting nuclear power. 
Congress' recent activities in this area, such as the reorgani-
zation of the federal regulatory agencies in 1974,lIi4 the permit-
ting of states to subject nuclear plants to state health regula-
tions no less stringent than those applicable to other energy 
sources,lIill and the Nuclear Waste Act of 1982,lII6 could not real-
150. Pacific Gas at _, n.18, 103 S.Ct. at 1724, n.18. 
151. 435 U.S. 519 (1977). 
152. [d. at 558. 
153. Pacific Gas at _, 103 S.Ct. at 1731. 
154. Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, 88 Stat. 1233, 42 U.S.C. 5801-5891. 
155. 42 U.S.C.A. § 7422 [hereinafter cited as section 122]. As part of the 1977 Clean 
Air Act Amendments, the states and the EPA inter alia under section 122 have the 
authority to set air quality standards and emission levels for the control of radioactive 
air pollutants for purposes of protecting public health. Because radioactive emissions are 
deemed to be air pollutants under the Clean Air Act, the states have the authority to 
regulate such emissions independently. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 7416 [hereinafter cited as Sec-
tion 116]. However a state's standards may not be less stringent than those required by 
the E.P.A. Section 116 provides in part: . 
[N]othing in this chapter shall preclude or deny the right of 
any state ... to adopt or enforce (1) any standard or limita-
tion respecting emissions of air pollutants or (2) any require-
ment respecting control or abatement of air pollution except 
. . . any emission standard or limitation which is less stringent 
[than one already required by the EPA]. 
In turn, the EPA's requirements may be vetoed by the NRC upon a determination that 
"the application of such standard or limitation to a source or facility within the jurisdic-
tion of the [NRC] would endanger public health or safety." Clean Air Act § 122(c)(3), 42 
U.S.C.A. § 7422(c)(3).' 
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istically indicate a desire by Congress to promote the industry. 
Rather, the preemption of state regulation was necessary to pro-
tect the public from the radiological hazards of nuclear power. U7 
Despite Congress' recent legislation, the Court has chosen to in-
terpret Congress' inaction in amending the Act as indicating 
that Congress never intended the states to provide protection to 
citizens. Thus, any state action in the 1980's has a strong chance 
of conflicting with a federal goal mandated in 1954, if that state 
action contains "anti-nuclear sentiment" or questions the poli-
cies of the industry as a whole. 
2. Concurrence 
Justice Blackmun would have refused to find that a safety-
motivated prohibition on construction would be preempted, opt-
ing to reach that issue when it is necessary to disposition of the 
case. IllS Additionally, Justice Blackmun disagreed with the ma-
jority that such a prohibition would be improper. In support of 
his finding that the dicta was wrong, Justice Blackmun found 
that the area occupied by the federal government was limited to 
the "narrower area of how a plant should be constructed and 
operated to protect against radiation hazards"l1l9 and the Act 
void of any language indicating a clear and manifest purpose to 
prohibit states from considering safety aspects when exercising 
their traditional authority to choose which technology to rely on 
in meeting their energy needs.160 This concurrence voices the 
concerns of other commentators that unless the states are al-
lowed to address the risks associated with nuclear power, the de-
cision of whether to build a plant, and the benefits of continuing 
to operate it will be left to the utilities seeking to build and op-
erate a plant. 161 
However, §§ 116 and 122 of the Clean Air Act demonstrates an explicit manifestation 
from Congress that the States may regulate nuclear energy activity in order to protects 
its citizenry. [d. 
156. H.R. REP. No. 3809, 97th Cong., 2nd Sess 26-29, (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S. 
CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 3792-94. 
157. See generally, S. REP. No. 370, 36th Cong., 1st Sess. 8-9, (1959), reprinted in 
1959 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 2872, 2879-80. 
158. Pacific Gas at _, 103 S.Ct. at 1732. 
159. [d. at _, 103 S.Ct. at 1732-1733. 
160. [d. 
161. See Wiggins, Federalism Balancing and the Burger Court: California's Nu-
clear Law As A Preemption Case Study, 13 U.C.P.L. REv. 3, 64 (1979). 
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In criticizing the majority's conclusion that a ban on con-
struction for safety reasons would stand as an obstacle to the 
goals of Congress to encourage the development of nuclear 
power, Justice Blackmun took a more balanced view of the goals 
of Congress by focusing on the recent acts of Congress. Justice 
Blackmun, in observing that Congress has not evidenced a dicta-
torial intent for every State to build nuclear plants,"IS2 would 
have found that the recent legislation not only allows states to 
prohibit the construction of nuclear plants, but indicates a Con-
gressional purpose to "place greater relative emphasis on non-
nuclear energy.utSS Yet, Justice Blackmun avoided the issue of 
whether a state prohibition on safety grounds would conflict 
with a NRC judgment that it was safe to construct or operate a 
plant by stating that a "flat ban for safety reasons . . . would 
not make compliance with federal and state regulations . . . a 
physical impossibility."!M ' 
While Justice Blackmun correctly notes that neither the 
NRC nor Congress has mandated that the states conclude that 
con"struction is "safe,"!6& the concurrence leaves unanswered how 
a conflict would be avoided should a state conclude that a 
plant's construction would be unsafe in· light of the unresolved 
disposal problems. Thus, Justice Blackmun's failure to articulate 
which safety motivated legislation would cause a conflict which 
arguably undermines his position. 
V. THE TROUBLES WITH STOCKPILED WASTE: WHAT CHOICES 
REMAIN FOR THE STATES IN THE FUTURE? 
As the midpoint of this decade approaches, states and their 
consumers are faced with the prospect of nuclear power plants 
being. decommissioned due to a lack of interim storage space 
caused by the federal government's inability to develop a perma-
nent disposal method. ISS The possibility of shutdowns will com-
162. [d. at _,103 S.Ct. at 1734. 
163. [d. at _, 103 S.Ct. at 1733. 
164. [d. at _,103 S.Ct. at 1733. 
165. [d. at _, 103 S.Ct. at 1733-34. 
166: See supra note 130 and accompanYing test; See also, U.S. Charts Plans for 
Nuclear Waste Disposal, CHEM. & ENG. NEWS. v. 61, July 18, 1983 (describing contro-
versy surrounding disposal of spent fuel; first waste depository not scheduled to open 
until 1998). 
30
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 14, Iss. 2 [1984], Art. 6
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol14/iss2/6
1984] NUCLEAR PLANT CONSTRUCTION 389 
pel states to reexamine their economic commitments to nuclear 
power. IS? In conjunction with this, the states may also move to 
protect the health and safety of its citizens in the event that the 
federal government is unable to develop a permanment method 
of disposal contemplated by the Nuclear Waste Policy Act. lsS 
Thus, the disposal problem may bring about litigation in which 
some states will attempt to exercise their traditional police 
power by ordering the utilities to close or decommission plants. 
This section will consider the consequences if, in the future, Cal-
ifornia's nuclear provisions result in the de facto exclusion of 
nuclear power plants. 
A. A Finding by the Energy Commission that Adequate 
Facilities to Store Spent Fuel Rods Does Not Exist 
Due to the federal government's rejection of reprocessing as 
a viable alternative,lse states such as California will ultimately 
have to silence the assertions by critics of nuclear power that 
accumulating nuclear wastes pose both a health risk and 
financial burden on the ratepayers. no In the event that the fed-
167. The estimate of the number of plants that will be required to close down due to 
a lack of space vary. See e.g. 7 ENVIR. REP. (DNA) 839 (1977) (twenty three plants by 
1987). However in a June, 1983 study, the NRC estimated that thirty-nine plants in 
nineteen states will be required to shutdown for lack of storage space. See infra note 130. 
In California, the Humboldt Bay plant closed in 1976 for "overall review" and possi-
ble strengthening of the seismic supports. In December, 1980, Pacific Gas and Electric 
withdrew its application to reopen the plant, leaving the status of the plant in limbo. See 
Decommissioning Nuclear Plants Isn't Easy, San Francisco Chronicle, March 14, 1982. 
There are three accepted methods of decommissioning: Inlmediate dismanteling, 
mothballing it for thirty years or so, and entombing it in a substance like concrete for a 
century. Id. As for the costs of a shutdown, while it is clear that the consumers will pay 
for it, the amount to be paid in millions of dollars is still unclear. See e.g., The Cost of a 
Shutdown: An Unclear Bottom Line, N.Y. Times, May 6, 1983 at I, col. 1 (describing the 
consequences if the Nuclear Regulatory Commission ordered the shutdown of Indian 
Point Units 2 and 3). 
168. During the 1975-1976 legislative seBBions, fifty bills were introduced in twenty-
four state legislatures having the effect of restricting or prohibiting the development and 
use of nuclear power. See Murphy and Lapierre, Nuclear "Moratorium" Legislation In 
The States And The Supremacy Clause: A Case of Express Preemption, 76 COLUM. L. 
REV. 392 (1976); See also Justices Uphold States In Barring Nuclear Plants, Wall 
Street J., April 21, 1983, at 4, col. 1 (describing how Pacific Gas ruling implictly clears 
laws in five other states and probably will encourage other legislatures to p888 similar 
laws). 
169. See supra note 130. 
170. See e.g., San Onofre A-Plant Pains, ENGINEERING NEWS RECORD, v. 211, at 38 
(1983) (describing how Public Utilities Commission is investigating seismic and safety 
benefits); Showdown at Diablo Canyon, Newsweek, August 10, 1981 at 51-52 (describing 
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eral government fails to meet the deadlines set in the Nuclear 
Waste Policy Act of 1982, California could, under section 
25524.l(b), find that one or several of the plants lack sufficient 
interim storage space. Alternatively, California arguably could 
decide that the benefits its ratepayers receive by having an oper-
ating reactor are outweighed by the potentially unsafe and eco-
nomically staggering consequences of allowing waste to stockpile 
at an ever-increasing rate.1?1 If California unilaterally decides to 
order the decommissioning of one or several nuclear reactors, 
the delicate regulatory scheme reviewed by the Pacific Gas court 
will again have to be evaluated.172 
1. Closure of a Plant on Economic Grounds 
It is indisputable after the Pacific Gas opinion that under 
subsection k of section 274 of the Atomic Energy Act, the states 
retain authority to regulate nuclear energy activities for a vari-
ety of non-radiation purposes that relate to the generation, sale, 
or transmission of electric power. 173 However, in conjunction 
with this, a state order to close a nuclear plant may imply an 
ancillary concern over radiation for two reasons. First, a state 
arguably would be instructing the federal government how to 
operate the plant by ordering the utility or NRC to close the 
plant. Second, an order by a state to close the plant could argua-
bly conflict with the Congressional goal of "the promotion of nu-
cost overruns, preparation by police authorities in anticipation of thousands of arrests, 
and location of plant 2 V2 miles from a major earthquake fault); Diablo Canyon Protest, 
San Francisco Chron., April 16, 1984, at 11, col. 1 (describing arrests of 23 people after 
NRC voted to grant license to test low-level power capability). As this article went to 
publication, a suit had been filed in the Washington D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals to 
block any testing at Diablo. The opponents of Diablo allege that the Commission, inter 
alia, failed to require a number of environmental and safety studies required of other 
plants in the event of a core meltdown, and that the Commission failed to adequately 
address the effects of a major earthquake. See Diablo Foes Appeal To Block Testing, 
San Francisco Chron., April 17, 1984, at 5, col. 1. For every day that the Diablo plant is 
not on-line, the consumers of Pacific Gas and Electric pay $1,000,000 in interest costs. 
See Scientists OK Testing of Diablo Reactor, San Francisco Chron., April 7, 1984, at 12, 
·col. 1. 
171. Even where all nuclear power plants shut down, there still would be forty years 
accumulation of radioactive work to deal with. See, U.S. Charts Plans for Nuclear 
Waste Disposal, CHEMICAL & ENG. NEWS, July 18, 1983 at 20. 
172. In Pacific Gas, Section 25524.1(b) was found not to be ripe for review. See 
supra notes 1-42 and accompanying text. 
173. Pacific Gas at _, 103 S.Ct at 1725. 
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clear power."l74 
However, in light of the language in Pacific Gas, a statute or 
referendum to close a nuclear plant should be within the power 
of a state, despite a challenge on grounds of preemption. In re-
viewing the Atomic Energy Act, one finds that the Act and its 
amendments are void of any express preemptory language. Sec-
ond, while federal regulation of the operation of a commercial 
plant is pervasive, a request by a state to close down a plant 
would not physically interfere with the actual operation. More-
over, even the utilities would be hard pressed to argue success-
fully that the scheme of federal regulation is so pervasive as to 
infer that Congress intended that states, under section 274(k), 
could not exercise their traditional power to supply adequate 
service at reasonable rates. In conjunction with this, it would 
seem illogical for a reviewing court to determine that a state 
could decide, under section 274(k), the initial need for a generat-
ing facility, but after the construction of the plant, the same 
state would be prevented from deciding that its continued oper-
ation would be uneconomical. 
Notwithstanding the holding in Pacific Gas that California's 
decision to prohibit construction did not conflict or stand as an 
obstacle to Congress' purpose to "develop nuclear power," a 
state attempting to close plants would face a challenge that the 
state action stands as an obstacle to Congress' goal. In address-
ing this argument, the states should reiterate that the NRC has 
not determined that it would be economically wise to continue 
to operate a commercial plant, nor has the NRC the power to 
compel a state to continue to operate a plant.171i Thus, if Califor-
nia eventually seeks to halt the operation of a plant, it would be 
well-advised to develop an economic rationale for doing so. 
2. Closure of a Plant on Safety Grounds 
In the wake of the Three Mile Island incident178 and other 
174. Id. at _, 103 S.Ct. at 1730-31. See supra note 96. 
175. See supra note 86 and accompanying text. 
176. See Fantasy Island, 75 Philadelphia Magazine, March 1984 at 86 (Describing 
the state of conditions at the Three Mile Island plant, five years after the worst nuclear 
accident in American history). 
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reports of danger associated with the use of nuclear power, 177 
public support for nuclear power has dropped steadily; people 
throughout the nation are opposed to nuclear power for safety 
reasons.178 The possibility of another mishap similar to Three 
Mile Island, or a new environmental crisis spurned by neglect of 
stockpiling waste remains engrained in the consciousness of both 
scientist and civilian alike. State action to close nuclear plants 
out of environmental or even psychological concernsl79 (arising 
from the stress associated with a hazard among the community), 
remains a viable and realistic alternative to states dissatisfied 
with nuclear power. 
Under Pacific Gas, such a state action would be subject to a 
preemption challenge. The Pacific Gas Court stated in dicta 
that "the federal government maintains complete control of the 
safety and 'nuclear' aspects of the construction and operation of 
a plant. "180 Hence, Pacific Gas can be interpreted to hold that if 
a conflict would arise as to a judgment of whether nuclear power 
was "safe," the states would be preempted from pursuing a state 
action grounded in safety concerns.18I However, this dicta is sub-
ject to challenge on several grounds. 
177. See e.g., 5 Atomic Plants Ordered Shut to Inspect Pipes for Cracks, N.Y. 
Times, July 15, 1983 at 42, col. 1 (describing order to close five plants due to cracks in 
cooling pipes; ~rder follows discovery of cracks in cooling pipes in thirteen other plants, 
seven of which were also closed). See also U.S. Sees Questions For Three Mile Island, 
N.Y. Times, May 21, 1983 at 9, col. 1 (describing conclusions of Nuclear RegUlatory 
Commission staff members that they can no longer vouch for the integrity and ability of 
the operators of the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant. 
See, also Bleak Future Described For Nuclear Power, San Francisco Chron. Feb. 7, 1984 
(Polls show a drastic drop in public acceptance with twice as many people now opposing 
the building of new plants). 
178. See e.g., Hundreds Arrested at New Hampshire Atom Protest, N.Y. Times, 
May 2, 1977 at I, col. 1; 150 Protestors at A-Plant Arrested, Los Angeles Times, Aug. 7, 
1983, at 3, col. 1-
See also Silkwood v. Kerr McGee Corp., __ U.S. __ , __ , n.12, 104 S.Ct. 615, 639 
n.12, in which Justice Powell acknowledged the dramatic increase in public concerns over 
all nuclear activities. 
179. See, Fantasy Island, 75 Philadelphia Magazine, March, 1984, at 86. (Describ-
ing effects of accident on local populace); See also Metropolitan Edison Company v. Peo-
ple Against Nuclear Energy, __ U.S. __ , 103 S.Ct. 1556 (1983). In that case, the 
Supreme Court reversed a finding by the Third Circuit that NEP A required the NRC to 
consider the psychological health damage from the>risk of nuclear accidents to local resi-
dents that restarting one of the units would cause. Id. at __ , 103 S.Ct. at 1562-63. 
180. Pacific Gas at __ , 103 S.Ct. at 1726. 
181. See supra note 70 and accompanying text. 
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First, as Justice Blackmun noted in the Pacific Gas concur-
rence,182 Congress has only decided how a plant should be built 
and operated to protect against radiation hazards; the Atomic 
Energy Act is void of any clear and manifest purpose to require 
states to ignore dangers which pose an environmental threat, or 
impose psychological stress on its citizens. Moreover, as the Pa-
cific Gas Court noted, the NRC has not determined that states 
must operate nuclear plants, only that it is safe to do SO.188 
A challenge to a state action to close down a plant for safety 
reasons would find strong support in the dicta of Pacific Gas, 
where the majority stated: 
At the outset, we emphasize that [section 25524.2] 
does not seek to regulate the construction or op-
eration of a nuclear power plant. It would clearly 
be impermissible for California to attempt to do 
so, for such regulation, even if enacted out of non-
safety concerns, would nevertheless directly con-
flict with the NRC's exclusive authority over 
plant construction and operation. Respondents do 
broadly argue however, that although safety regu-
lation of nuclear plants by states is forbidden, a 
state may completely prohibit new construction 
until its safety concerns are satisfied by the fed-
eral government. We reject this line of reasoning. 
State safety regulation is not preempted only 
when it conflicts with federal law. Rather, the fed-
eral government has occupied the entire field of 
nuclear safety concerns, except the limited powers 
expressly ceded to the states. When the federal 
government completely occupies a given field or 
an identifiable portion of it, as it has done here, 
the test of preemption is whether "the matter on 
which the state asserts the right to act is in any 
way regulated by the federal government."l84 
Clearly, the dicta in Pacific Gas is dangerously broad and 
could deprive states of a lawful exercise of their police power. By 
requesting the closure of a plant for safety reasons, California 
would not be seeking to interfere with the technically difficult 
182. Pacific Gas at 1732-1733. 
183. See id. at _, 103 S.Ct. at 1724. 
184. Id. at _, 103 S.Ct. at 1726 (citation and footnote omitted). 
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job of operating a plant and containing the waste from it; rather, 
a state would be deciding that the physical health of its citizens 
endangered by potential radiation leaks and the intangible psy-
chological problems created state-wide by the anxieties sur-
rounding a potential public hazard are not worth the continued 
operation of a plant. As the Pacific Gas Court observed, states 
have been given the opportunity to impose more stringent stan-
dards in the area of air pollution,186 and siting and land use re-
quirements.188 It appears arbitrary for the Pacific Gas Court to 
hold that California may prevent a nuclear power plant from be-
ing constructed in a densely populated or seismically unstable 
area and thereafter regulate emissions from the plant, but that 
same state could not protect its citizens for health and psycho-
logical reasons only because Congress, through its inaction, has 
failed to· include such an express delegation of power in the 
Atomic Energy Act. Moreover, a state, seeking to close a plant 
could argue that their action is a rejection of a source of electric 
power; clearly under section 271187 a state has the power to make 
such a traditional regulatory decision. As long as it is uncertain 
what permanent disposal method the federal government will 
develop, the increasing volume of stored wastes poses an envi-
ronmental hazard to its citizens of both present and future gen-
erations.188 A state should not be deprived of the power to de-
cide what method of generating electricity is most appropriate 
for its environment, simply because of federal occupation of the 
safety of operating a plant. 
B. Impact of the Pacific Gas Dicta After the Silkwood 
Decision 
There are further considerations of consequences of the 
wide reaching dicta of the Pacific Gas court that the federal gov-
ernment has occupied the entire field of nuclear safety concerns, 
except the limited powers expressly ceded to the states. In 
Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp.189 the Court concluded in a five 
to four decision that a state-authorized award of punitive dam-
185. See supra note 155, and accompanying text. 
186. See supra note 117, and accompanying text. 
187. See supra, note 59. 
188. See Tribe, California Declines The Nuclear Gamble: Is Such A Choice Pre-
empted? 7 ECOLOGY L.Q. 679, 717 n.158 (1979). 
189. _ U.S. _, 104 S.Ct. 615 (1984). [hereinafter cited 88 Silkwood] 
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ages,190 which arose out of the escape of plutonium from a feder-
ally-licensed nuclear facility,191 'was not preempted by the 
Atomic Energy Act or the Price Anderson Act.192 In Silkwood, 
the majority observed that the Pacific Gas holding "that the 
federal government has occupied the entire field of nuclear 
safety concerns, except the limited powers expressly ceded to 
the states,"19S was not dispositive of the issue of whether the 
state authorized award of punitive damages was preempted, 
since inter alia, "the right of the State courts to establish . . . 
liability . . . [was] maintained,194 . . . even though [Congress] 
was aware of the NRC's exclusive authority to regulate safety 
matters. 196 
In conjunction with this, while the majority noted that there 
would be instances in which the federal law would preempt the 
recovery of damages based on state law, the majority observed 
that "preemption should not be judged on the basis that the 
federal government has so completely occupied the field of 
safety that state remedies are foreclosed, but on whether there is 
an irreconcilable conflict between the federal and state stan-
dards or whether the imposition of a state standard in a dam-
190. An award of punitive damages was considered by the Tenth Circuit to be "reg-
ulatory" for two reasons. First, "any state action that competes with the AEC (NRC) in 
its regulation of radiation hazards "[is] impermissible." Silkwood, 667 F.2d 908, 923 
(1Oth Cir. 1981). Second, because "a judicial award of exemplary damages under state 
law as punishment for bad practices or to deter future practices. . . is not less intrusive 
than direct legislative acts of that state. [d. 
191. Karen Silkwood was employed by Kerr McGee Nuclear Corp., a subsidiary of 
Kerr McGee Corp., as a laboratory analyst at an Oklahoma plant which fabricated pluto-
nium fuel pins for use as reactor fuel in nuclear power plants. Silkwood was contami-
nated by plutonium over a three day period in 1974; on the third night she was killed in 
an unrelated accident. The administrator of her estate brought a diversity action. based 
on common law tort principles under Oklahoma law, in order to recover for the injuries 
to Karen's person and property. See, __ U.S. __ , __ , 104 S.Ct. 615, 618 (1984); See 
also RACHKE, THE KILLING OF KAREN SILKWOOD (1982) 
192. Pub. L. 85-256, 71 Stat. 576 (1957). See Silkwood at __ , 104 S.Ct. at 623. 
"The Price Anderson Act was passed in response to the nuclear industry's concern over 
potentially bankrupting state-lawsuits arising out of a nuclear incident. The Act required 
that operators of a commercial facility obtain $60 million in private financial protection; 
the government would then provide indemnification for the next $500 million of liability, 
and the resulting $560 million would be the limit of liability for anyone nuclear 
incident." . 
193. Pacific Gas at __ , 103 S.Ct. at 1726. 
194. Silkwood at __ , 104 S.Ct. at 624. 
195. [d. at __ , 104 S.Ct. at 625. 
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ages action would frustrate the objectives of the federallaw. Hl96 
Hence, after Silkwood, the analysis of a majority of the Court 
does not appear to be an inquiry into whether a specific state 
action was expressly ceded to the states, but whether the state 
action will conflict with the federal standards or frustrate the 
purposes or objectives of the Atomic Energy Act.197 
C. State Action to Close Nuclear Plants As An· Obstacle 
To Congressional Intent 
Under both Pacific Gas and Silkwood, a reviewing court 
must consider whether the state action conflicts with federal law 
by making compliance with both laws impossible or by the state 
law standing as an obstacle to the accomplishment of a purpose 
of Congress. In addressing this problem, a court should not sim-
ply confine its inquiry to the question of whether both laws can 
be physically complied with, for it is clear that the utilities and 
the NRC have the capability of turning a plant off or keeping it 
on line. Rather, the real issues before a reviewing court are so-
cial, political and economic. In addressing such issues the court 
must consider the opposition of the people themselves to nuclear 
power, for such opposition has become increasingly vocal over 
the past decade.19s The court must also consider the concern of 
the state and its obligation to protect the unborn of future gen-
erations. In conjunction with this, however, the court must con-
sider the reality of economics and the billions of dollars that 
have been invested in the industry to the utilities and the rate-
payers themselves. 
196. [d. at _, 104 S.Ct. at 626. 
197. In a strong three point dissent, Justice Powell, joined by the Chief Justice and 
Justice Blackmun, first reiterated the dicta in Pacific Gas that "Congress has occupied 
entirely the field of nuclear safety concerns." Silkwood at _, 104 S.Ct. at 634-635. 
Second, Justice Powell noted that there was no express language in either the Atomic 
Energy Act or the Price-Anderson Act which allowed a state-authorized punitive damage 
award against the nuclear industry. [d. at _, 104 S.Ct. at 637. Third, the dissenters 
rejected as unfounded the majority's reliance on 'indirect evidence' of a congressional 
intent not to preempt the state-authorized award. [d. 
In a separate dissent, Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice Marshall, concluded that the 
Silkwood decision "wreaks havoc" with the federal regulatory system. [d., at _, 104 
S.Ct. at 627. In addressing the Pacific Gas decision, Justice Blackmun observed that 
"the fundamental teaching of Pacific Gas is that state regulation of nuclear power is 
preempted to the extent that its purpose is to regulate safety." [d. at 104 S.Ct. at 628. 
198. See supra note 178. 
38
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 14, Iss. 2 [1984], Art. 6
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol14/iss2/6
1984] NUCLEAR PLANT CONSTRUCTION 397 
Despite the language of the Pacific Gas court and the 
Silkwood dissent, for a number of reasons the issue is one of the 
states' power to determine their destiny. Clearly, there is no ex-
press language in the Atomic Energy Act which states that the 
individual states must have nuclear power; the only edict from 
the federal government has been the NRC's determination that 
nuclear power is "safe."199 In conjunction with this, the review-
ing court should consider that the Atomic Energy Act was 
drafted in the mid-1950's in a different economic setting and at 
a time when no single member of Congress anticipated the waste 
problems that exist today. A review of the legislative history 
reveals that the federal government maintained strict control 
over the infant industry for defense purposes and to assure that 
the technical difficulties associated with commercial nuclear gen-
eration of electricity would be met.200 In light of serious waste 
problems associated with nuclear power, a court should not con-
clude that the purpose of Congress is to "promote nuclear 
power" simply because Congress has not rewritten the Atomic 
Energy Act. 
·It has been suggested that a reviewing court must also con-
sider whether Congress constitutionally may exercise its power 
to force directly upon the states Congress' choice as to how es-
sential decisions regarding the conduct of integral governmental 
functions are to be made. In National League of Cities v. 
Usery,201 the United States Supreme Court found invalid Con-
gress' command (pursuant to its Commerce Clause authority) to 
state governments to pay certain state employees minimum 
wage.202 In Usery, the Court inquired as to whether the mini-
mum wage attempted to "devour the essentials of state sover-
eignty,"20S and whether the determination of the minimum wage 
was "[a] function essential to separate and independent exis-
tence."204 If the Usery court concluded that minimum wage was 
199. Pacific Gas at _, 103 S.Ct. at 1729. 
200. See supra notes 1-7 and accompanying text. 
201. 426 U.S. 833 (1975). 
202. [d. at 855. See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 115 (1941) where the 
Court observed: "Whatever their motive and purpose, regulations of commerce which do 
not infringe some constitutional prohibition are within the plenary power conferred by 
Congress by the Commerce Clause." 
203. Usery at 845 (quoting Mr. Justice Douglas, dissenting in Maryland v. Wirtz, 
392 U.S. 133, 205 (1968». 
204. Usery at 845 (quoting Coyle v. Oklahoma, 221 U.S. 559, 580, (1911». 
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a traditional aspect of state sovereignty, a reviewing court must 
also conclude that the manner in which a state will regulate the 
generation of electricity as a vital aspect to a state's separate 
and independent existence. Thus, even if a court finds that Con-
gress has impliedly required California to accept and continue to 
operate nuclear reactors, proponents of nuclear power will have 
shown that this federal mandate is justified by "an extremely 
serious problem which endanger[s] the well-being of all the com-
ponent parts of our federal system and which only collective ac-
tion by the National Government might forestall."20Ii In light of 
the decline of the nuclear industry, and the public and state gov-
ernmental opposition to nuclear power, a reviewing court should 
consider Congress's inaction as implied consent to a state's deci-
sion to reduce its dependence on nuclear power. 
v. CONCLUSION 
The United States Supreme Court's validation of section 
25524.2 was premised on the state's traditional police power to 
regulate the need for and generation of electrical power. The 
preemption analysis employed in Pacific Gas may be viewed as a 
straightforward application of the Rice preemption test to an in-
dustry regulated primarily by the federal government. However, 
the unanimous decision in Pacific Gas suggests the Court's will-
ingness to prohibit the powers of the States from regulating the 
construction and operation of a nuclear plant if the attempted 
regulation either conflicts with a federal determination as to the 
safety of a plant or if the states' law could conceivably interfere 
with the continued development of nuclear power. In light of the 
controversy surrounding the nuclear industry, the dicta in Pa-
cific Gas will likely be subject to litigation in the future years. 
Derek G. Howard * 
205. [d. at 351-853 citing Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542. See generally L. TamE, 
AM. CONST. LAWS 379-394 (1978). 
• Third-year student, Golden Gate University School of Law. 
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